Most interpreters of Aristotle claim that he either explicitly posited or at least implied a Grand End theory of practical reasoning as part of his ethical teachings. Sarah Broadie, in her 1991 book Ethics with Aristotle, denied this claim, which prompted Alasdair MacIntyre to respond in kind. After summarizing Broadie’s objection and MacIntyre’s rejoinder, I shall explore the deeper philosophical reasons that underpin MacIntyre’s conviction regarding this matter, establishing that the Grand End conception of practical reasoning is a supposition held (...) throughout MacIntyre’s mature body of writings. Then I shall argue for the main thesis of this paper, that MacIntyre’s conception of practical reasoning entails that he also maintains an inclusive end conception of the human good, which necessarily follows from his specific view of practical reasoning. Alasdair MacIntyre calls attention to what other scholars in some ways neglect: the conception of a Grand End is advantageous for the practical reasoning and virtuous living of even the average person. (shrink)

In this paper we shall consider whether John Rawls’s treatment of Ignatius of Loyola is a fair one. Rawls claims in A Theory of Justice that Catholic theology (and Ignatius’s theology in particular) aims at a “dominant end” of serving God that overrides other moral considerations. Rawls argues that dominant end views lead to a disfigured self and a disregard for justice. We do not question Rawls on the normative issue of whether dominant end conceptions are untenable, but rather on (...) his factual claim that Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general presupposes a dominant end view as he defines it. The Loyola whom Rawls attacks in Theory of Justice is a straw-man. Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general embraces something closer to an inclusive end view, since it argues that several different ways of virtuous living can lead to happiness. (shrink)

In this paper we shall consider whether John Rawls’s treatment of Ignatius of Loyola is a fair one. Rawls claims in A Theory of Justice that Catholic theology aims at a “dominant end” of serving God that overrides other moral considerations. Rawls argues that dominant end views lead to a disfigured self and a disregard for justice. We do not question Rawls on the normative issue of whether dominant end conceptions are untenable, but rather on his factual claim that Ignatian (...) spirituality and Catholic theology in general presupposes a dominant end view as he defines it. The Loyola whom Rawls attacks in Theory of Justice is a straw-man. Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general embraces something closer to an inclusive end view, since it argues that several different ways of virtuous living can lead to happiness. (shrink)

Robert Reilly’s America on Trial presents a lengthy defense of the principles of the American Founding against recent critiques, especially focusing on those written from a Catholic perspective. His book finds a place in a larger discussion of American Catholic political thought that has been going on for more than a century. I first situate Reilly’s book within that debate, and then argue that Reilly’s account is correct on most counts. Some loose ends remain, but they can be dealt with (...) by expanding some of the points that Reilly has already made. I think, though, that other points not even raised by Reilly’s critics will require further reflection by future American Catholic political thinkers. In 2020, the sensus communis in America has ceased to be “cool and deliberate,” a desideratum for the regime mentioned in Federalist 63; we need to figure out ways to make it cool again. (shrink)